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Kosovo mythology might be perceived as 
one of the indirect causes for bloodshed sur-
rounding the wars, conflicts and atrocities made 
in this newly independent state. Kosovo might 
also be regarded as the place where the vio-
lent dissolution of Yugoslavia began. The 1981 
student unrest in Prishtina, the province’s capi-
tal, showed the fragility of post-Tito Yugosla-
via, as an omen for future years (Ker-Lindsay, 
2009; Ramet, 2000; Udovički, 2000). Kosovo was 
again, in 1989, a centre of a nationalistic out-
break. Then President of Socialist Republic of 
Serbia, Slobodan Milošević gave a speech on 
Kosovo (Gazimestan) Field, marking the 600th 
anniversary of the Kosovo battle, with a refer-
ence to the possibility of “armed battles”. Ten 
years later, Serbia attacked Kosovo Albanians, 
and twenty years later Kosovo was already an 
independent state. Throughout all these years 
two myths fought for the truth about Kosovo, two 
political myths with anti-democratic sentiments, 
extreme nationalism and new authoritarianism. 
One of them is the Serbian one which perceives 
Kosovo as the heart and soul of Serbian national 
and religious identity; this one is well known and 
in this paper it will be regarded only as an op-
posite to the new myths of the Albanian side. 
The other one, the Albanian one, is the basis 
for Kosovar nation-building. These mythologies 
proclaimed themselves as saviors of the na-
tion and civilization. In a poor attempt to follow 
Samuel Huntington’s version of the clash of 
civilizations, Serbs and Albanians unconsciously 
followed the ideas of Fernand Braudel, Oswald 
Spengler and Arnold Toynbee in arguing that 
states were significantly influenced by their civili-
zational position (Hansen, 2000: 346), i.e. based 
on their historical and religious identities, in this 
case presented by Christian Orthodox Serbs and 
mostly Muslim Kosovo Albanians. Although the 
concept of Huntington’s conflict of civilizations 
(at least understood in a way as Braudel under-
stood them) was disputed and still is the subject 
of complex discussions, he correctly pointed out 
the importance of cultural and historical back-
ground for the events and conflicts in modern 
world, and especially so in the Balkans. The aim 
of this paper is to explain how and why Kosovo 
Albanians use the history and culture to promote 
“Albanianess” of the new Kosovo state. Opinions 
expressed here are focused on politics of history 




A War of Myths: Creation of the Founding Myth of Kosovo Albanians 
VEDRAN OBUĆINA
Politea: Association for Promotion of Social Sciences and New Media, Zagreb
A distinctive Albanian character is present in the shaping of Kosovo’s statehood. 
The official politics of history and identity diminish the importance of other 
ethnic communities and focuses on Albanian mythology, represented by mixture 
of contemporary and historical personalities, events, places and memories. 
Integrative and European-leaning from outside, Kosovo is more and more 
particular and Albanian from inside, leaving many doubts and uncertainties 
about the intercultural future of Europe’s newest state. 
Keywords: Kosovo, Albanians, founding myth, memory, identity politics
Vedran Obućina: A War of Myths
suvremene TEME, (2011.) god. 4., br. 1.
CONTEMPORARY issues, (2011) Vol. 4, No. 1
centar za politološka istraživanja
the political science research centre
www.cpi.hr
31
events which form the overall official politics of 
Kosovar identity, but which bear an unofficial Al-
banian mark. Under the pretext of a European-
oriented new state, built upon the togetherness 
of six ethnic communities, this paper shows how, 
in fact, there is little or no mention of other com-
munities, except the Albanian one, in the build-
ing of the youngest state in Europe. 
2. Building a New Nation
Nation-building gained broad acceptance in 
the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. Numer-
ous multi-national states experienced heavy con-
flicts and the policy of nation-building came after 
peace operations conducted by various interna-
tional organizations, primarily United Nations, 
NATO, European Union and African Union. Koso-
vo is one such case. The United Nations Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK) authorities, together with the 
military presence of North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO) and the European Union Rule of 
Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), with the help 
of other European Union (EU) initiatives, and 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) are making the nation-building 
process coming true. Jochen Hippler considers 
nation-building as a policy that “constitutes a 
hinge between foreign, development and military 
policy for the purpose of preventing or manag-
ing violent conflicts, achieving local and regional 
stability, and facilitating development” (Hippler, 
2005: 4). Such a presence of various interna-
tional organizations in Kosovo bears a question 
of legality to enter internal state-building, despite 
the principle of non-interference under the UN 
Charter, which can always be overruled by the 
Security Council. External nation-building, like in 
the case of Kosovo, is thus always questioned 
and disputed. Hippler conceives nation-building 
as a three-fold process, including a process of 
socio-political development, a political objective, 
as well as a strategy, and integrative ideology. 
The latter includes the founding myth of the Kos-
ovar nation. Nation-building will only be success-
ful in the long term if it stems from an integrative 
ideology. This is not an easy task. Hippler sees 
nation-building necessarily as a process of form-
ing of a nation which has no specific identity or 
loyalty attached to a tribe, a clan, or an ethnic 
or ethno-religious group (Hippler, 2005: 8). In 
Kosovo, as we shall see, this is not so easily dis-
tinguishable, even among the Kosovo Albanians 
themselves. Integration of a society is what Hip-
pler names as the core pattern of communica-
tion between different and loosely associated 
groups. At the same time, this is where interna-
tional organizations have failed. It would not be 
conceivable in any specific way to convince, for 
example, Albanians, Goranis and Ashkalis to be 
one Kosovar nation, as all three have an already 
established national consciousness. In this re-
gard, the international community has put all its 
effort and energy in the biggest national group, 
the Albanians, as the core of the Kosovar nation. 
In this way, they jeopardized the possibility for 
other ethnic groups to perceive themselves as 
part of the Kosovar nation.
In Hippler’s opinion, a crucial component of 
nation-building is the development of a function-
al state apparatus that can actually control its 
national territory (Hippler, 2005: 9). In Kosovo, 
a substantial role is carried out by international 
organizations, including the protection of nation-
al territory, and it thus lacks the Weberian prin-
ciple of statehood: monopoly of legitimate use 
of physical force in the enforcement of its order. 
In that way, state-building is an important aspect 
of nation-building, with loyal personnel that does 
not identify primarily with individual social, eth-
nic or religious communities, but rather with the 
state and the nation. Without social mobiliza-
tion and political integration, there is no nation 
state in pluralistic societies and no process of 
socio-political development, which ideally allows 
initially loosely linked communities to become a 
common society with a nation state correspond-
ing to it. Hippler acknowledges it takes quite 
an amount of luck for everything to be solved 
correctly, because the new nation has to bear 
economic integration, cultural integration, politi-
cal centralization, bureaucratic control, military 
conquest or subjugation, creation of common 
interests, democratization and establishment of 
common citizenship or repression. Hippler also 
understands a problem which heavily persists 
in Kosovo, namely if belonging to the nation is 
to be determined according to language, ethnic 
origin or religion rather than on the basis of civil 
equality. Hippler sees two arising problems here:
“First, there is a danger that ethicizing the po-
litical discourse in the context of latent conflicts 
and social mobilization will lower the threshold 
for violence and trigger violent conflicts which 
are ethnically structured. Secondly, such a 
context transforms the nation-building pro-
cess: instead of striving for or achieving the 
integration of society as a whole, the alterna-
tive then arises of conducting nation-building 
either as a repressive project of hegemony 
by one ethnic group over others or bringing 
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about a situation of competition between dif-
ferent nation-building projects conducted by 
the various ethnic groups. Both lead to the 
intensification of existing conflicts and the risk 
of these being waged in a violent manner in 
the future” (Hippler, 2005: 12).
In Kosovo, this problem arises from the bot-
tom up. The Constitution of Kosovo, much differ-
ent from most surrounding countries, does not 
recognize one particular ethnic group as a domi-
cile nation. The preamble is approved by “the 
people of Kosovo”, and Article 2 states that “The 
Republic of Kosovo is a state of its citizens”. The 
peoples are not mentioned as nations or ethnic 
groups, but as communities, and the names of 
these communities are mentioned only in the ar-
ticles about the division of power in the state. Ar-
ticle 64, Paragraph 2, on Structure of Assembly, 
explicitly names the communities:
“In the framework of this distribution, twenty 
(20) of the one hundred twenty (120) seats 
are guaranteed for representation of commu-
nities that are not in the majority in Kosovo 
as follows: (1) Parties, coalitions, citizens’ 
initiatives and independent candidates hav-
ing declared themselves representing the Ko-
sovo Serb Community shall have the total 
number of seats won through the open elec-
tion, with a minimum ten (10) seats guaran-
teed if the number of seats won is less than 
ten (10); (2) Parties, coalitions, citizens’ ini-
tiatives and independent candidates having 
declared themselves representing the other 
Communities shall have the total number of 
seats won through the open election, with a 
minimum number of seats in the Assembly 
guaranteed as follows: the Roma community, 
one (1) seat; the Ashkali community, one (1) 
seat; the Egyptian community, one (1) seat; 
and one (1) additional seat will be awarded 
to either the Roma, the Ashkali or the Egyp-
tian community with the highest overall votes; 
the Bosnian community, three (3) seats; the 
Turkish community, two (2) seats; and the 
Gorani community, one (1) seat if the number 
of seats won by each community is less than 
the number guaranteed.”
In the government, power-sharing insists on 
one Serbian representative and one represent-
ative for other ethnic communities. The con-
stitutional provisions are a direct effect of the 
Ahtisaari package, transformed in his compre-
hensive proposal which determines the outlines 
of the future state (Ahtisaari, 2007). Ahtisaari 
stressed the importance of a multi-ethnic soci-
ety, with several official languages. But, the situ-
ation on the ground is quite different. Albanians 
basically can offer quite big minority rights be-
cause they themselves are the overwhelmingly 
biggest ethnic group in Kosovo. Of the 230.000 
Serbs and other non-Albanians who fled Kosovo 
before the international peace-keeping troops 
arrived only a small number returned. The Alba-
nians themselves are victims of terror, corruption 
and organized crime. Kosovo institutionalized 
ethnicity (Bieber, 2004: 2) and the power-shar-
ing lacks fundamental features of cross-ethnic 
cooperation. Based on Arend Lijphart’s model 
of consociative democracy, Kosovo can also be 
understood as a failed attempt of power-sharing, 
because it has a fragile territorial autonomy and 
basically poor veto rights, which include only a 
possibility to delay procedure (Bieber, 2004: 3). 
Apart from provisions in the parliament, also, the 
international community did not show much re-
spect for democracy, especially in early years. 
Council of Europe’s human rights envoy Álvaro 
Gil-Robles stated:
“…it is clear that the very structure of the in-
ternational administration as well as certain 
powers retained by its various branches, sub-
stantially deviate from international human 
rights norms and the accepted principles of 
the rule of law” (Gil-Robles 2002: 4).
The problem from the international law stand-
point is also that Kosovo is not a fully recognized 
state, nor a UN member. In fact, NATO, for ex-
ample, is still conducting its mission Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) based on UN Resolution 1244, 
which does not perceives Kosovo as an inde-
pendent state. Kosovo is also under heavy influ-
ence of Western forces and particularly United 
States. Self-determination is thus one of the cen-
tral demands and concepts of Kosovo Albanian 
nationalistic politics. It is best conceived in the 
Vetëvendosje movement (which literally means 
“Self-Determination”), a quasi-movement nation-
alistic party in Kosovo, which considers UNMIK 
administration to be a non-democratic regime, 
and requests full self-determination and inde-
pendence immediately (Party Manifesto). In the 
meantime, United States Institute for Peace stat-
ed in its report that the Albanian question “will 
almost surely require more extensive regional 
arrangements than exists today” (USIP, 2002: 
4). Reports like this, however, place a heavy bur-
den on Balkans politics. If the Albanian question 
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is to resolved everywhere in the Balkans, then 
it must be perceived as one common territory. 
This is, at the same time, the greatest desire of 
ultra-nationalistic Albanian forces in Kosovo, but 
also in some neighboring countries. The spirit of 
Greater Albania, thus, has not yet vanished in 
the history of great nationalistic ideas’ failures.
3. Mythology and Politics
The end of the 20th century has shown a re-
markable return to political mythology, history 
and old-fashioned national and ethnic identity. 
It was often accompanied by a conflict, some-
times very violent one, just as was the case in 
the republics of ex-Yugoslavia. New political 
communities arose, with the need of establish-
ing the political institutions, but also comprehen-
sive and mutual history, remembrance and his-
torical legitimization. The context of Central and 
South-eastern Europe was particularly under in-
fluence of historical revisions and the search for 
a true national identity. This middle-space, Mit-
teleuropa or Zwischeneuropa, shares the cultural 
and religious “raw cosmopolitanism”, meaning a 
plethora of religious denominations and cultural 
backgrounds living one next to another. The real 
Mitteleuropa has a distinctive Catholic character, 
with early Christianization and the history of con-
flict with Islam. Yet, they share quite much of the 
mentality with the rest of the region, essentially 
in conceiving themselves as a threatened nation, 
with a feeling of a profound tragic and suffering, 
loneliness from other nations, lack of solidarity 
among the neighbors and open prejudices. In the 
past, all of them have had illiberal, authoritarian 
and totalitarian regimes, often with xenophobic 
and anti-Semitic elements. The particular case 
of Yugoslavia had several reasons for difficult 
nation-building: unfavorable geopolitical condi-
tions, extreme differences in the level of eco-
nomic development, great cultural heterogene-
ity, and dual process of nation-building, romantic 
nationalist idea, different pace of nation-building 
and state-building, no hegemonic nation that 
could successfully keep its dominant position 
(Zakošek, 2007: 36, 37). When the Berlin Wall 
fell and a new democratic wave spread across 
the former communist states, nations began to 
re-write their constitutions. This constitutional 
engineering was various, but many included vast 
preambles with historical references going back 
to the early stages of statehood. Slovakia, for 
example, found its roots in the Great Moravian 
Principality, a medieval vassal state founded 
with the help of St. Brothers Cyril and Metho-
dius. Croatia, on the other hand, included all 
historical documents of bigger importance, start-
ing from the Croatian principalities in 7th century 
and ending with the Homeland War in the 1990s. 
Kosovo’s constitution is noticeably different from 
many other former communist countries. Firstly, 
Kosovo and Albania were under foreign rule for 
centuries, but central power (either of Istanbul, 
Vienna or Belgrade) was indeed very weak, 
and Albanians did not know the classic totalitar-
ian or authoritarian institutional paradigm, but a 
deeply patriarchal and clan-divided society. Only 
with Enver Hoxha in Albania came a new kind of 
paternalism. After the fall of communism, the re-
vival (Rilindja) was in fact a start anew. The pre-
amble of Kosovo has no historical reference and 
is very short. It is more like a plea, stating that 
the people of Kosovo are determined, committed 
and convinced to freedoms and equalities, de-
mocracy and prosperity, stability and peace, and 
with an intention to enter Euro-Atlantic integra-
tions. But, at the same time, Kosovo prepared 
itself for building of national founding myths, as 
the basis for future state, with a distinctive Alba-
nian character.
The renowned 20th century philosopher Ernst 
Cassirer explained that in man’s practical and 
social life there is a defeat of rational thought, 
much different from scientific researches which 
consists a basis of our everyday life influenced 
by modern technology and scientific break-
throughs. He perceives myth not only as a prod-
uct of intellectual processes; it sprouts forth 
from deep human emotions (Cassirer, 1946: 43). 
However, Cassirer stressed that myth cannot 
be described as a bare emotion because it is 
the expression of emotion: “The expression of 
a feeling in not the feeling itself – it is emotion 
turned into an image” (Cassirer, 1946: 43). In-
deed, this image, in the creation of myth of the 
state, is intertwined with culture, music, poetry, 
arts. Cassirer said: “To the true romanticist there 
could be no sharp difference between myth and 
reality; just as little as there was any separa-
tion between poetry and truth. Poetry and truth, 
myth and reality interpenetrate each other and 
coincide with each other” (Cassirer, 1946: 5). 
The more poetic it is, the truer it becomes. Myth 
is filled with the most violent emotions and the 
most frightful visions, says Cassirer. But in myth 
man begins to learn a new and strange art: the 
art of expressing, and that means of organizing, 
his most rooted instincts, his hopes and fears. It 
is not at all a new phenomenon in history of man-
kind’s thought. But, the core issue is whether this 
brings happiness and prosperity to the mankind. 
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Plato thought it doesn’t. In his famous dialogue 
Gorgias Plato points out that the triad of Logos, 
Nomos, Taxis (Reason, Lawfulness and Order) 
constitutes beauty, truth and morality. It appears 
in art, in politics, in science, and in philosophy. 
They are the virtue of each thing, of a soul or any 
live creature and it is the evolution of rightness. 
Maybe we can conclude that, as men are by na-
ture imperfect, this triad is of perfect and divine 
nature, so Plato strived for impossible. The myth 
destroys the very foundation of Plato’s Republic. 
In his research on mythology of the post-
communist countries, the Romanian political sci-
entist Tismaneanu stated that political myths are 
“responses to the sentiments of discontinuity, 
fragmentation, and the overall confusion” (Tis-
maneanu, 1998: 6). This trend, in fact, is not 
new. It persisted during the whole period of com-
munism, hidden within the myth of brotherhood 
and unity among socialist nations. Post-com-
munist nationalism is a political and ideological 
phenomenon with a dual nature: as an expres-
sion of an historical cleavage, it rejects the spuri-
ous internationalism of communist propaganda 
and emphasizes long repressed national values; 
also, it is a nationalism rooted in and marked 
by Leninist-authoritarian mentalities and habits, 
directed against any principle of difference and 
primarily against those groups and forces that 
champion pro-Western, pluralist orientations (Tis-
maneanu, 1998: 7). Tismaneanu showed vividly 
the examples of Romania and Serbia, where 
post-communist governments were formed by 
ex-communist forces. In the case of Slobodan 
Milošević, he recognized an astute demagogue 
who cynically exploited Great Serbian national-
ism to further his own hegemonic-dictatorial pur-
poses.
In post-communist mythological landscape, 
the myth of suffering is omnipresent. According 
to this vision, no other nation has suffered as 
much as the one of the speaker, who simply can-
not understand why the outer world is so insensi-
tive to his or her nation’s unique plight (Tismane-
anu, 1998: 8). It is evident in conspiracy theories 
in the case of Serbia, where the whole West, 
Freemasons and Vatican act together against 
bravery and patriotism of the Serbian people. 
In Croatia it is profoundly present in the myth of 
Croatian soldiers who never fought in conquer-
ing wars and in the character of the Homeland 
War as a just, defensive and collective fight for 
the independence long dreamed of. The suffer-
ing on Kosovo is entrenched in a parallel sys-
tem of life, in an imposed isolation (see below). 
Members of the nation are gathered around this 
myth in order to become closer and to “invent 
a tradition” in the words of Eric Hobsbawm, or 
to “imagine a nation”, like Benedict Anderson 
would say. The nation is a big solidarity, says Er-
nest Renan, and it is based on victims and their 
sacrifice which is understood as necessary in 
the past, present and in the future (Renan, 1995: 
56). Political myth transcends logic, it is elusive, 
but because of this elusiveness, it has a coher-
ent and complete belief system. There is neither 
legitimacy nor logic other than its own. Tismane-
anu mentions major themes around which such 
political mythologies revolve: Golden Age (inno-
cence lost, glorious patriarchal beginnings, the 
fall into modernity); victimhood, martyrdom, trea-
son and conspiracy; salvation and the advent of 
the millennium; charismatic saviors (who can be 
heroic individuals, allegedly predestined class-
es, or biologically defined races); and ultimate 
bliss in the form of revolutionary chiliasm, when 
leader, movement, nation, and mankind become 
one, whether in life or death (Tismaneanu, 1998: 
9). Its principal function is to imagine a reality in 
accordance with certain political interests. 
Historical places and events form a particu-
larly important part of political mythology. His-
tory has great significance in legitimizing current 
political regimes, especially if they are identified 
with a charismatic savior with a sense of history 
(like Franjo Tuđman in Croatia, who was a his-
torian himself, or the Gandhi-like leader of the 
Kosovar Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova). Common 
history produces common feelings and strength-
ens the nation. If it is connected to live emotions 
of particular people, it is prone to intimate use 
in every aspect of their life. In a research made 
by Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen on popu-
lar uses of history in American life, a 50-year-
old African American high school counselor from 
Alabama described how a focus on experience 
grounded his reflections on the past: 
“If you didn’t live through certain things, you 
just go by what people say, what history says. 
If they lived through it they know what they 
are talking about. I lived through segrega-
tion. My grandchildren are learning about it in 
school. It’s hard for me to know anything that 
I didn’t come through. I didn’t come through 
slavery times. But integration times I came 
through. When my kids read something they 
can say, ‘Is it true?’ and I know because I was 
there” (Rosenzweig and Thelen, 1998: 37). 
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Memory of one person is not only individual 
memory, however: it forms our identity and se-
cure the context for certain thought or action 
which are partly learned, partly borrowed, and 
part of common complex itself, constructed, main-
tained and forwarded by family, community and 
culture (Moore, 1992). In situation of common 
suffering of particular ethnic group, like Kosovo 
Albanians in the 1990s, this version of the story 
is very social-integrative and it legitimizes cer-
tain idea or regime. It is especially important in 
big historical events like war. Heroes and places 
of memory form significant part if this legitimacy 
and the recollection of “true” version of events, 
encoded in historical books and official historical 
account. According to Croatian political scientist 
Tihomir Cipek, for a political order to be legiti-
mate, a common conception of history accept-
able to the majority must be formed. He points 
out that a capability of forging a dialectical con-
nection between collective memory and an inter-
pretation of the past is profoundly necessary to 
found a democratic political community (Cipek, 
2011: 27). The context of memory shapes the 
national identity and vice versa. In the case of 
France, for example, it went so far that the French 
Parliament voted on an act on memory, lois mé-
morielle, in order to regulate the nation’s relation 
to its own history. Otherwise, common amne-
sia might blast the whole historical version into 
oblivion. Transiency is one of basic characteris-
tics of memory, with periodical “flashbulb memo-
ries”, often conceived as a vital part of testimo-
nies on war criminal courts like ICTY (Dulanović, 
2011: 35). Dimitrijević (2005) classified types of 
history in question as: (1) History that is the past, 
left to historians, and without much significance 
for current events, (2) History integrated in col-
lective memory, segments that represent social, 
cultural and political foundation of communal life, 
(3) Heritage of the old regime, comprising institu-
tions and values, personalities and processes in 
previous, mostly anti-democratic regimes, and it 
brings with it the economic, political and lawful 
heritage, as well as the heritage of evil. In this 
way the past very much influences contempo-
rary political and social development.
4. The Mythology of Kosovo Albanians
As many other founding mythologies, so was 
the Albanian also perceived as a fight against 
injustice. The victim role is very visible in the Al-
banian history in Kosovo. Historian Marco Dogo 
accused Kosovo Albanians of having “construct-
ed a historical pedagogy based in self-pity”, while 
the anthropologist Reineck observes suffering 
(vuajtje) as a fact of life, because the Albanians 
“identify themselves as a backward, forgotten, 
plundered people, characteristics which they feel 
make them special” (Clark, 2000: 45).
Kosovo Albanian mythologies persisted over 
centuries, but their true realization came after 
NATO’s operation in 1999, the first military op-
eration in the history of the Alliance, and the be-
ginning of international missions of UN, EU and 
OSCE. At that time, the number of Serbs dimin-
ished, as well as of some other ethnic groups. 
Few of them returned, mainly in Serbian autono-
mous municipalities like Gračanica and Štrbce. 
Kosovo Albanians, on the other hand, gained 
much power and freedom to establish a rule of 
order according to their needs and ideas. 
Kosovo’s constitutional framework bears no 
marks of historical rootedness of the new estab-
lished country. The flag and the emblem give a 
symbol of a unified nation. The blue flag bears 
a yellow geographical form of Kosovo with six 
yellow stars around it, confirming Kosovo’s de-
termination, as vested in the Constitution itself, 
to strive towards Euro-Atlantic integrations. The 
six stars represent six ethnic communities liv-
ing in Kosovo. The flag is basically an answer 
to Ahtisaari proposals which include “own, dis-
tinct, national symbols, including a flag, seal 
and anthem, reflecting its multi-ethnic character” 
(Ahtisaari, 2007). Everyday showing of the flag 
is a bit different. Although there are visible Ko-
sovo’s flags, an overwhelming number of flags 
in Kosovo, on tops of houses and on the roofs 
of many buildings, are Albanian. It is a red ban-
ner with a double-headed black eagle. Heraldic 
history of the Albanian flag suggests its origin 
in Byzantium, but it is also believed to have its 
origins in the seal of the greatest Albanian hero 
Skanderbeg. A variation of Albanian colors is 
present also in the emblems and flags of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK). In highly unof-
ficial and unscientific research, the author of 
this article found out from citizens of Prishtina 
how these two flags are mutually compatible. 
“Kosovo is our country”, say the most of them, 
“and thus we embrace the Kosovo flag”. “But”, 
they continue, “we are Albanians, and the flag 
of all Albanians is red-black”. Surely, their ethnic 
relatives in neighboring countries embrace the 
Albanian flag as well, giving a sense of together-
ness and commonness, although living in quite 
different surroundings. 
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5. Places of Memory
Also, other visible marks bear an Albanian 
accent. The most important place of memory in 
Kosovo today is the Prekaz valley, pretty much 
opposed to the former most important place of 
memory on Kosovo Field (Gazimestan), incorpo-
rating the Serbian myth. Prekaz is a small village 
in north-western Kosovo with martyr symbolism. 
The story begins in December 1991, when Ser-
bian police surrounded the village and opened 
fire. Villagers resisted. Albanian political leaders 
reacted almost immediately, calling for a peace-
ful solution. The police raided the village, looking 
for Adem Jashari and his brother, who were ac-
tive against Serbian oppression. They escaped 
to Switzerland, helped by a schoolteacher Jakup 
Krasniqi, a former political prisoner and current 
chairman of Kosovo Parliament. In 1993, Jashari 
returned and transformed his home in Prekaz to 
a centre-place for forming the Kosovo Libera-
tion Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës). On 22 
January 1998, police attacked the Jashari fam-
ily compound in Prekaz. The Serbian forces re-
turned on 5 March, surrounding the village and 
killing Adem Jashari and more than 40 members 
of his family. Today, their graves form a memorial 
center. It consists of white graves, among them 
the grave of Adem Jashari guarded by a ceremo-
nial guard, with the nearby fountain resembling 
a traditional Islamic prayer fountain. There is a 
path leading to the hill above, with a secret com-
pound for kaçak fighters (Albanian guerrilla fight-
ers) involved in battles around Prekaz. Jashari’s 
burned and destroyed house is preserved in-
tact, while visitors pass by pictures and murals 
of Adem Jashari and his fellows. The bearded 
sculpture of his image is also present everywhere 
in Kosovo. There is also an information center 
built in modern victorious architecture style. The 
scenery is packed with red-black Albanian flags 
and symbols of UÇK. Strangely enough, there is 
no mosque in Prekaz, and Islamic symbolism is 
present only in form of a crescent on the graves 
of country’s martyrs.
Prekaz brings additional symbolism for Al-
banians. This memorial site is called the field of 
peace. In early 1990s, this was the site where 
Albanian families came for a ritual of reconcilia-
tion and ending of blood feuds and blood venge-
ance. This tradition began to spread after the 
fall of communism, based on centuries of feuds 
according to the 15th century Kanun or Canon 
of Lëke Dukagjini, which enshrined the princi-
ple. A retired professor Anton Cetta, fearing the 
danger of disunity among Albanians on troubled 
Kosovo, called for reconciliation in Prekaz. Re-
appearance of blood feuds based on Kanun 
was not welcomed by everyone. A human rights 
activist Pajazit Nushi, whose organization had 
recorded some 40 blood feud related murders 
from 1999 to 2003 (Judah, 2008: 29), perceives 
blood feuds as “a consequence of the poor func-
tioning of law and order and the institutions that 
regulate the law”. Stephanie Schandwer-Sievers 
thinks it derives from Roman law, and today it 
has become part of the canon of Albanian iden-
tity (Fischer and Schwandner-Sievers, 2002). 
Kanun, however, is not only a blood feud code. 
It includes the pillars of the very essence of Al-
banian identity: honor (nderi), hospitality (mik-
pritja), right conduct (sjellja) and loyalty to one’s 
clan (fis). The supreme expression of the Alba-
nian moral code is the vow, besa, which was an 
extremely important part of cohesiveness of the 
movement of civil resistance in the 1990s. Every 
hero and every martyr bears these characteris-
tics. Additionally, in the most marginalized areas 
of northern Albania the collapse of the former re-
gime provoked recourse to pre-communist cus-
toms. Here, a revitalization of traditionalist ritual 
and rhetoric has occasionally produced a fragile 
order; including the negotiation of local authority 
and the redistribution of land (although this has 
mostly benefited particular interest groups at the 
expense of those who could not claim land rights 
through descent). Reference to Kanun here is 
contested and situational, unpredictable, pro-
voking new conflicts and subject to an abuse of 
local power which many locals detest and wish 
to see replaced by the more predictable exertion 
of state law (Schwandner-Sievers 1999). Lastly, 
criminal interest groups, often deriving from the 
most disadvantaged parts of northern Albania 
and Kosovo, have used “tradition” to conceal 
their informal interests and to enforce group cohe-
sion via the threat and usage of violence against 
those defined as “traitors”, both inside and out-
side the country (Schwandner-Sievers 2001).
Another martyr place of memory is the village 
of Raçak. In early 1999, the massacre of civil-
ians, including women and children, drew atten-
tion of Louise Arbour, prosecutor for the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). The head of OSCE’s mission in Kosovo 
described the atrocities as following: “A village 
that had one KLA member would be subject to 
being surrounded by artillery, being surrounded 
by the army, being surrounded by the police, be-
ing bombarded for hours; the police units would 
then go in, separate the men and the boys, take 
them off and essentially pillage and loot and burn 
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the village” (Pond, 2006: 103). Raçak is today 
a vital commemoration site, whose red graves 
bear the two-headed black eagle sign. 
6. Albanianism as Religion
It should be noted here, as Tim Judah does in 
his introduction book on Kosovo (Judah, 2008), 
that these martyrs cannot be compared to sha-
hids (a traditional name for Islamic martyrs who 
fought and died for the faith). Quite contrary, 
Albanian martyrs are called dëshmorëte kom-
bit (martyrs of the nation), and they, in the very 
essence, represent the sacrifice for their coun-
try and their unrecognized or oppressed nation. 
These kaçak warriors stem from the 1912 revolts 
in Kosovo. They were fighting against Serbian, 
and later Yugoslav rule. Their most famous mili-
tary leaders were Azem and Shota Bejta, and the 
political leadership was vested in the Committee 
for the National Defense of Kosovo. They sup-
ported rebellion inside Kosovo, lobbying for the 
liberation and re-unification of Albanian lands. 
Their general set of rules in 1919 was the same 
as in 1990s (Clark, 2000: 27). These included 
peace with all local Serbs who do not stand with 
weapons in their hands, and protection of all 
houses and churches. In response, Belgrade brought 
četnik brigades. Azem Bejta made eight demands 
in 1919, which again echo in 1990s (Clark, 2000: 
27): recognize Kosovo’s right to self-government, 
stop killing Albanians, stop taking their land, stop 
the colonization program, stop army actions on 
the pretext of “disarmament”, open Albanian 
schools, make Albanian an official language and 
stop interning the families of rebels. According to 
some historians, kaçaks made strong symbolic 
demonstration of the fact that many Kosovo Al-
banians did not accept the legitimacy of Serbian 
or Yugoslav rule; and they seriously obstructed 
the colonization program, to the point where many 
would-be settlers were reluctant to go to Kosovo, 
and many who went returned home (Clark, 2000: 
28), which again resembles the situation in 1990s. 
In the Second World War, however, kaçaks were 
regarded as fascist collaborators in the later Yu-
goslav official history, although the Balli Kombëtar 
(National Front, BK), was in fact a resistance 
movement against the Italian occupation of Alba-
nia, but in 1943 the cooperation with the commu-
nist-led National Liberation Movement of Albania 
broke down. The communists openly started to 
interpret the fighting with BK as anti-fascist strug-
gle. In response, BK became openly collabora-
tionist, with an open goal of the unification of Ko-
sovo with Albania (Clark, 2000: 29). 
Jashari is the new Skanderbeg, the real na-
tional icon for Kosovo Albanians. His image is 
ubiquitous; he embodies the struggle and con-
tinuous resistance of Albanians. His image and 
founding myth of Kosovo is so strong, that he be-
comes a visual and symbolic icon even for Alba-
nians living outside Kosovo. Islam, on the other 
hand, does not play a vital role among kaçaks, 
although Jashari, his whole family and almost all 
kaçak fighters in Prekaz were Muslims. In 2000 
there were estimations to be around 60 thou-
sand Albanian Catholics in Kosovo, and very 
few Orthodox Albanians (Judah, 2008: 7). It fol-
lows the pattern of Albania proper, where some 
10 percent of population is of Catholic religious 
background, and some 20 percent belong to 
Orthodox churches, among them mostly to the 
Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania (CIA 
World Fact Book, 2009). The estimates of Mus-
lim population are between 70 and 79 percent, 
although all of these are data for religious back-
ground, and not for practicing religion. Generally 
speaking, Albanians are a very secular people 
(Judah, 2008: 8). Quite a number of practicing 
Muslims, on the other hand, belong to the liberal 
Sufi, Bektashi group, regarded as heretical by 
most Muslim worshippers in Islamic world com-
munity (ummah). Islam in Kosovo adopted local 
traditions. Kosovo was once a central point of 
Balkan Sufism, standing on Via Egnatia, a ma-
jor link between Istanbul and Balkan countries. 
Towns like Peja (Peć), Djakovë (Đakovica) and 
Prizren, together with Albanian centers in Alba-
nia proper (Berat, Gyirokastër, Krujë and Tirana), 
and in Macedonia (Skopje/Shkup, Tetovë) were 
centers for important Sufi brotherhoods, especially 
Ria’iyya and Bektashiyya (Norris, 2006: 9). Broth-
erhoods acted like secret societies, and the Bek-
tashi order started to have more a rational and 
free-thinking aura, bearing a political message. 
No wonder, thus, that the brothers Frashëri, of-
ten considered as the founding fathers of Alba-
nian nation, were Bektashi, and Naim Frashëri’s 
major work is called Bektashi Pages (Norris, 
2006: 10). Influenced by Turkish and especial-
ly Persian thought and poetry, Albanian Sufis 
spread an idea of togetherness and equality.
Also, it is noteworthy that the Illyrian tribes of 
Dardanians, who are favored among the Albani-
an ethno-genetic researchers of Kosovar ances-
tors, were fiercely Catholic, closely connected to 
Vatican. This connection never ended, and there 
are speculations given from a close associate of 
Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of Kosovo Albani-
ans, Catholic priest Lush Gjergji that he convert-
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ed to Catholicism before he died.1 Although the 
Catholics were in a worse condition than Ortho-
dox believers in the Ottoman times, the Catholics 
promoted Albanian education. Jesuits set up an 
“Illyrian College” in Italy in 1574, and there was a 
widespread phenomenon of crypto-Catholicism, 
i.e. families who publicly adopted Sunni Islam, but 
received Catholic sacraments in private (Clark, 
2000). The identity of Albanians, however, does 
not stem from religion, but from Albanian national 
consciousness. Albanian Catholic poet Pashko 
Vasa wrote in 19th century that “the religion of the 
Albanians is Albanianism”, which was included 
in the slogan of the nineteenth century League 
of Prizren, the first experience of real Albanian 
nationalism. This body fought for unification of 
the Albanian lands and the establishment of an 
Albanian state within the Ottoman Empire. Later 
on, the League opposed Istanbul and started to 
fight against it. In 1878, 300 Albanian delegates 
from four Ottoman provinces (vilayets) where Al-
banians lived (Kosovo, Monastir (today Bitola), 
Janina and Scutari or Shkodër) gathered in the 
city of Prizren in southern Kosovo to form the 
League. The purpose was initially to protect Al-
banian lands against assaults from neighboring 
countries - Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montene-
gro, and it was the first such organization made up 
by both Muslim and Christian Albanians. It was a 
herald of new Albanian rebirth or renaissance or 
Rilindja (Trix, 2010: 359). It was the beginning of 
Albanianism as a religion. Albanians would need 
a national narrative to make their sovereignty 
claims sound plausible: from pieces of tribes, 
they had to defend the cause of an Albanian na-
tion and create one distinctive Albanian culture. 
Sami Frashëri wrote at that time: “Albania runs 
greater risks that will show their roots in times of 
peace, without blood and arms. It is the war of 
schools and literature, the war of nationalism (...) 
The Greeks, the Slavs and the other neighbor-
ing countries do not want to recognize the ex-
istence of Albanian nation. Each of them uses 
their own faith to attract those Albanians sharing 
their religion”. This is why the attractive force of 
religion in providing to the collective associa-
tion was dangerous for Albanians. They are a 
threat to nationalistic religion and precisely the 
reason why Albanians turned out to be quite an 
“atheist” people (Ypi, 2007: 667). Language and 
history became indicators of the country’s au-
thenticity and formed the basis for Rilindja (Ypi, 
2007: 668). Ypi compared the rise of the Alba-
nian nation to the classic idea of civic national-
1  See http://balkanupdate.blogspot.com/2006/01/rugova-
died-christian.html.
ism, expressed in the thought of Rousseau (Ypi, 
2007: 671), but focused on a specific difference: 
Albanians had hardly ever experienced citizen-
ship in an autonomous political community, but 
for the mythical Illyrian age and the short season 
of anti-Ottoman resistance under Skanderbeg. 
These two form, therefore, the very foundation 
of the Albanian nation. But, the future might bring 
some unexpected turns. The center of Prishtina 
is packed with Christian symbols. Mother The-
resa Boulevard forms the pedestrian zone in the 
very city center, finished with her statue. Mother 
Theresa, born Agnes Gonxha Bojaxhiu in Skop-
je, was of Albanian Catholic origin (although her 
family was in fact Vlach). At times of Rugova’s 
rule her image spread across Kosovo, as a sym-
bol of peaceful Albanian desire and plea. Around 
the University of Prishtina compound, which also 
forms the very center of Prishtina, there are 
also two churches. One is an unfinished Ser-
bian Orthodox Church (the so called Milošević’s 
Church, because the Serbian leader started to 
build churches all around Kosovo in 1990s, sym-
bolizing the Serbian character of Kosovo), and 
the other one is Mother Theresa Catholic Cathe-
dral, the ownership of Catholic Church in Albania 
and Kosovo. The biggest mosque, however, is in 
the Old Town (çarshia). The Muslim movements 
now request that the central Kosovo mosque be 
built around the University, next or opposite to the 
Catholic Church, shouting at the same time about 
Christian occupation of Albanian Muslim identity. 
Otherwise, identity formation is very ambiguous in 
Kosovo; people change their ethnic identity or con-
vert to another religion without completely forget-
ting the legacy of previous identities. Their belief 
systems are thus based on unconscious and un-
reflective fusion and borrowing (Duijzings, 2000). 
Although religion plays a complex role in the 
development of group identities, Albanians have 
never really stressed the importance of religion for 
their society. But, Duijzings reminds that even Al-
banians at one time attempted to use religion as a 
marker, but it failed, because the nation is divided 
into at least three, or as Duijzings suggests, possi-
bly four religious traditions: Muslim, Catholic, Ortho-
dox and Bektashi. The heterodox Islam in the Bal-
kans is especially in focus here as it gave rise to a 
number of identities. The religious differences were 
blurred: “Muslims and Christians of different ethnic 
background have visited each other’s sanctuaries, 
worshiped each other’s saints and ignored the evi-
dent theological objections of religious orthodoxies” 
(Duijzings, 2000: 2). Thus, common pilgrimages or 
Crypto-Catholicism were possible. And all these de-
velopments were political constructs, as Duijzings 
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suggests: “...the formation and transformation of 
ethnic and religious identities is determined by wid-
er political developments (Duijzings, 2000: 22).
7. A New Politics of History
Prekaz is the founding myth of new Kosovo 
and Jashari is the new hero, but Kosovo has a 
deep desire to defend itself, in a way, from “other 
heroes”. One of them is for sure Miloš Obilić, a 
mythical character of Serbian history. He is the 
legendary assassin of Ottoman sultan Murad I, a 
holy warrior canonized in Serbian Orthodox Church, 
although his historical presence in the Battle of Ko-
sovo, and the battle itself, is often contested by 
various historians. Albanians contest the very na-
tionality of Miloš Obilić, although in those times the 
notion of nationality used to be somewhat blurry 
and instable. According to the Albanian version, 
Miloš was in fact Kopiliqi, an Albanian version of 
the contested true name of the Serbian hero. In 
that way, Albanians diminish the importance of 
Kosovo Battle for the Serbs, and paradoxically 
revoke Albanian traditional resistance to every 
foreign rule, including the Ottoman Empire. That 
is one of the reasons why a town near Kosovo 
battlefield is still called Obilić (Obiliq), and has 
not changed its name, like some other towns in 
Kosovo. 
The politics of history gains ground in Kosovo 
today. It derives from the “founding fathers” of 
Albanian nation, brothers Frashëri, who turned 
their people “from a scattered array of clans into 
a nation”. Albanians consider themselves as Il-
lyrians and Dardanians, calling thus sometimes 
Kosovo Dardania, meaning the Pear Country. Ko-
sovo is a name of Slavic origin, meaning blackbird 
field, and bears special significance for Serbs, as 
“the cradle of Serbian civilisation” and “Serbian 
Jerusalem”. The Kosovo Albanian leader Ibra-
him Rugova toyed with the idea of renaming Ko-
sovo Dardania (Judah, 2008: 31). The question 
“who was here first” was always a fierce debate 
among Albanian and Serbian historians. Alba-
nian biggest contemporary writer Ismail Kadare 
has showcased the common Albanian stand-
point to it: 
“Any discussion on Kosovo today begins with 
the cliché: ‘sacred territory for the Serbs’; 
the ‘cradle of the Serbian nation.’...The core 
of [Serb] mythology goes as follows: at the 
time of the Battle in 1389, the Serbs were a 
majority in a region that was at the heart of 
their Kingdom; the Albanians only came into 
the territory after the battle. This is a crude 
distortion and its effect in any public discus-
sion on TV or elsewhere is to pre-empt any 
Albanian from putting across a different view 
or attempting some clarification of history... 
The Battle of Kosovo was not a confronta-
tion solely between Serbs and Turks. It was a 
battle fought by all the people of the Balkans 
united against an invader. All the histories list 
the names of the Balkan peoples who fought 
alongside one another against a common dis-
aster: Serbs, Bosnians, Albanians and Roma-
nians... The Battle which should have been 
preserved in memory as a symbol of friend-
ship between the Balkan peoples was appro-
priated by criminal Serbs to serve their pur-
poses.” (Judah, 2008: 24, 25).
Albanians claim descent from the ancient Il-
lyrians, while Slavs did not arrive in Kosovo until 
the sixth and seventh centuries AD. This claim is 
very important, because Serbian authorities, re-
garding this as an Austrian-instilled myth (in early 
20th century, before Albania gained independence), 
treat Albanians as immigrants and twice in the 
twentieth century they have sought to “repatri-
ate” Albanians in Turkey (Clark, 2000: xx). 
Called the modern day Skanderbeg, Jashari 
stands next to the biggest hero of Albanianism. 
Skanderbeg is omnipresent in every part of Bal-
kans where Albanians live. His statues adorn the 
main squares in Albanian cities. A very ambiva-
lent historical figure, Gjergj Kastrioti was born in 
1403, as a son of an Orthodox Christian Alba-
nian nobleman. He was later sent as a hostage 
to Istanbul, where he converted to Islam and took 
the name Skanderbeg, from the Turkish İskender 
Bey, meaning “Lord Alexander” (Judah, 2008: 
25). In 1443 he returned in Albania, converted 
back to Catholic Christianity and began his fight 
against the Turks. His vision was vivid among 
19th century Albanians, although most of them 
were Muslims. Projecting the images in con-
temporary world about past is often difficult to 
prove scientifically, especially because Skander-
beg’s daughter was married to a Serbian prince. 
Skanderbeg both allied with and fought against 
the Serbs. Overall, Skanderbeg was a truly Al-
banian hero, combining all possible religions, 
friends and foes of Albanian tribes, keeping the 
Albanian readiness to fight for the homeland. 
Over the centuries his religious orientation, the 
defender of Christianity, as he was known in the 
Christian world, was avoided, as well as his real 
domain, which never included Kosovo (Fischer 
and Schwandner-Sievers, 2002: 43). Skander-
beg’s 25-year revolt against Ottoman rule is also 
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a proof for Serbians who regard Albanians as vi-
tal ally of Turkish rule over the Balkans. In fact, 
Albanians continued to take part in conspiracies 
and military campaigns against the Ottoman Em-
pire, and there were frequent local revolts against 
new taxes, conscription, or attempts to disarm the 
local population. Some also used banditry as a 
form of defiance (Clark, 2000: 25). 
8. Peaceful Resistance
Among Albanians, education was always re-
garded as a national breakthrough. Over the centu-
ries various conquerors and governments refused 
to give education in Albanian language, fearing it 
could spread Albanian nationalism. Education was 
also one of the ways for peaceful resistance, an-
other founding myth, vested in the cultural rising 
in Yugoslavia and the parallel education system in 
1990s. The cultural revival came with the opening 
of the University of Prishtina, and with the Prishtina 
Radio and TV, and the Rilindja publishing house. 
The University was especially necessary, since a 
little number of Albanian students traditionally went 
to study to Belgrade or Zagreb. Although it boasts 
with many faculties, the most important ones were 
humanities and social sciences. A huge amount of 
Albanian students enrolled, with little or no pro-
fessional perspectives afterwards. The cultural 
re-awakening spread also in the countryside. 
Ibrahim Rugova recalls cultural and literary eve-
nings and festivals in 1970s, especially in Prizren, 
where Kosovo Albanians discovered themselves 
and ended blood feuds, and also some academic 
connection was possible between Prishtina and 
Tirana (Clark, 2000: 40). There, Albanians redis-
covered their historical heroes and events, com-
pleting in this way the politics of memory, places 
and events. It ended with uprisings and riots in 
1980s, labeled in the academic community as na-
tional awakening and demonstrations sparked by 
socioeconomic conditions and grievances. Some 
called for the unification with Albania, but this style 
of irredentism (especially called so in Belgrade) 
was not very plausible. As socio-economic condi-
tions were among the major reasons for uprisings, 
it would be difficult to expect for people to call 
for the unification with Albania, which was in far 
greater economic difficulties, as well as under 
harsh dictatorship of Enver Hoxha. The main call 
was – Kosovo Republic! Albanians wanted their 
own republic within the Yugoslav federation, which 
would change boundaries, taking in some parts of 
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as full 
respect of their national rights, recognizing Albani-
ans as one of the federative nations.
The prospect of violent conflict in difficult 
times was vigorously announced in Slobodan 
Milošević’s speech at Gazimestan Field. Albani-
ans easily understood the message. All violent 
and armed rebellion would finish in too many vic-
tims and it will be crushed by Yugoslav People’s 
Army (Jugoslovenska narodna armija, JNA). Kos-
ovo Albanians started to build their identity linked 
to non-violence, with the image of Ibrahim Ru-
gova as a modern-day Gandhi. Village football 
teams got new names, such as Durim (Endur-
ance) or Qendresa (standing firm) (Clark, 2000: 
46). The formative experiences for this strategic 
decision came from Trepča miners, who went 
through cold and snow for five full days, sticking 
the protest columns and inviting for the protest 
manifestation. Some 400.000 people protested 
and the event went without a single broken win-
dow, any kind of vandalism or destruction (Clark, 
2000: 48), while avoiding any gesture or slogan 
which could insult the Serbian people. Resist-
ance was often symbolically understood as a 
rebellion of Albanians, workers and humans, be-
cause the Serbian attitude was perceived as an 
attack on all three components. The vacuum left 
after the fall of communism was filled with new 
organizations, prone to introduce democratiza-
tion and Europeanization of Kosovo. In the first 
half of 1990, some of these organizations is-
sued an important declaration “For Democracy, 
Against Violence”, giving accent again on non-
violence as the option for survival. Philosopher 
Shkelzen Maliqi often regarded non-violence as 
being imposed on Kosovo Albanians: “The strat-
egy of nonviolence was somehow self-imposed 
as the best, most pragmatic and most efficient 
response to Serbian aggressive plans.” (Clark, 
2000: 66).
The non-violent liberation movement, howev-
er, ended in armed resistance. Kosovo Albanians 
waited hastily for some sort of Dayton Agreement 
in Serbia, after Milošević signed the treaty. When 
Serbian military and police operations turned from 
Bosnia to Kosovo, young Kosovars, disappointed 
with the international community and Rugova’s si-
lent opposition, turned violent. This was the crea-
tion of the Kosovo Liberation Army that started 
guerilla warfare for freedom (Pond, 2006: 102).
9. Conclusion
The collapse of Yugoslavia was often con-
sidered by cultural scholars as a consequence 
of primordial Balkan mentality, ancient hatreds 
between Balkan tribes. Although the nationalis-
tic sense of necessity for belonging is crucial in 
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this area, it nevertheless diminishes the impor-
tance of what I call “raw cosmopolitanism”, i.e. 
the necessity to live next to Other and to tolerate 
the Other. Kosovo might be an extreme case of 
primordial or essentialist nationalistic outburst, 
because the rate of inter-ethnic marriages or 
connections between the communities was and 
still is rare. Nevertheless, it did not diminish 
the ethnic mosaic living in Kosovo yesterday, 
as well as today, although on a smaller scale. 
International influence and instrumentalization 
by political leaders such as Slobodan Milošević 
surely favored the conflict, but I would stress the 
vital conclusion of Beverly Crawford, that post-
war institutions of ethno-federalism in Yugoslavia 
cemented the logic of identity politics in the Yu-
goslav federal structure (Crawford, 1998: 206), 
especially after constitutional changes in 1974., 
which brought the decline of central power and 
diminishing of loyalty to the federal state (Craw-
ford, 1998: 231). 
Objective account of history is an academic 
discipline, but rarely a political one. The creation 
of Kosovo state is a very modernistic achieve-
ment. Successful displays of ethnic symbolism 
in 1980s and 1990s, often artificially contrived, 
drew attention to those ethnic divisions perpetu-
ated by past institutional incentives (Crawford, 
1998: 199). In the best manner of classic 19th 
century national rebirth, Kosovo Albanians com-
bined national myths, stories, memories and ter-
ritorial pretensions with political maneuvers and 
current political possibilities. But, Kosovo might 
be regarded as a special case. The country that 
has not yet fully gained recognition in the world 
as an independent country, gives an image of a 
state based on civic nationalism, with wide pro-
tection of every ethnic community’s rights and 
with profound sense of Kosovar nation based 
on mutual respect and no specific ethnic back-
ground, as well as the constitutionally expressed 
desire for Euro-Atlantic integrations, shown also 
in the euro as a national currency. However, the 
image and policies show that Kosovo govern-
ment and most of its citizens perceive their state 
as an ethnic Albanian country. Many even ques-
tion whether Kosovo really is considering stay-
ing an independent country or is the creation 
of Kosovo merely a first step toward a Greater 
Albania, comprising of Albania proper, Kosovo, 
Western Macedonia, and parts of Montenegro, 
Serbia and Greece where Albanians live as a 
majority. The opinion polls about this question 
are ambivalent. United Nations Development 
Program in Kosovo made a poll in 2007 which 
showed that only 2.5 percent of Kosovo Albani-
ans wanted to merge with Albania, and 6 percent 
said they would like to live in an independent 
Kosovo (UNDP, 2007: 16). After independence, 
this thinking changed vastly. According to Gallup 
Survey made in 2010, 81 percent of Albanians in 
Kosovo supported the idea of Greater Albania, 
62.8 percent in Albania proper, and 51.9 percent 
of Albanians living in Macedonia.2 Albanian pres-
ident Sali Berisha reacted instantly and in sever-
al occasions, repeating that Tirana had no desire 
for a Greater Albania. Still, under the banner of 
common country, there is a distinctive Albanian 
cover, incorporated in official history, museums, 
places of memory, commemorative centers, mon-
uments, graveyards, names of cities, streets and 
squares, use of language (Serbian, as second 
official language is practically spoken only in 
Serb enclaves, coupled with the usage of the 
Cyrillic alphabet), and separation of ethnic com-
munities in enclaves. Official history shapes the 
minds of new generations and leaves little or no 
space for alternatives or for common history of 
all ethnic communities living in Kosovo. This po-
litical imaginary has no academic backup, but as 
is usually the case in politics of history, it does 
not need one. History is a reference point for a 
particular political agenda and interest. It does 
not diverge much in Kosovo today, from Kosovo 
yesterday. Contemporary Albanian political my-
thology is very similar in power, focus and meth-
ods to Serbian political mythology about Kosovo. 
Combined, they make a powerful clash point, a 
war of the myths which ended in violence and 
armed conflict. The Albanian myth prevailed. In 
that way, Kosovo Albanians are heading toward 
the politics of oblivion, with total annihilation of 
earlier history, and their role, positive and nega-
tive, in historical events. It is the common view 
that the nation with previous authoritarian or to-
talitarian past should look more into the future, 
leaving the burden of heavy history behind. But, 
at the same time, they are not dealing system-
atically with political, cultural and moral heritage 
of the past, and it threatens to fall into historical 
subjectivity, isolating certain events from broad-
er picture, and to historical revisionism, which is 
a legitimate scientific act, but can be very much 
instrumentalized by political actors. 
2 See Gallup, 2010, http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/index.
php/dashboard.
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Rat mitova: Stvaranje utemeljiteljskog mita kosovskih Albanaca
VEDRAN OBUĆINA
Politea: udruga za promicanje društvenih znanosti i novih medija, Zagreb
Poseban albanski karakter prisutan je u oblikovanju kosovske državnosti. Služ-
bena politika povijesti i identiteta umanjuju važnost ostalih etnničkih zajednica i 
usredotočuje se na albansku mitologiju, predstavljenu kroz mješavinu sadašnjih 
i povijesnih ličnosti, događaja, mjesta i sjećanja. Integrativno i usmjereno Europi, 
Kosovo je sve više partikularno i albansko iznutra, ostavljajući mnoge dvojbe i 
neizvjesnosti o interkulturalnoj budućnosti najnovije države Europe. 
Ključne riječi: Kosovo, Albanci, osnivački mit, sjećanje, politika identiteta
